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NOTES
WITHIN A CITY’S LIMITS: A LOCAL
GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO HOLD POLICE
OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE
Josselin Aldana*
When a person’s constitutional rights are violated by a public official,
such as a police officer, who acts under color of law, the official can invoke
a qualified immunity defense that immunizes the official unless it is clearly
established that such action is unlawful. Over the years, the qualified
immunity doctrine has developed into a shield that makes it difficult for
aggrieved individuals to recover when they are harmed. As a result of
nationwide focus on police brutality, four states—Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Mexico—have modified the use of qualified
immunity as a defense in state courts for individuals harmed by police
officers acting under their official authority. In 2021, New York City became
the first city to join these four states by enacting Local Law 48 of 2021 to
hold police officers accountable for use of excessive force and unreasonable
searches and seizures. Under the principle of home rule, however, the
legislative power of local governments is limited to what the state legislature
has delegated to them. Furthermore, states may preempt local governments
from exercising power in a manner inconsistent with state law.
This Note provides an overview of the development of qualified immunity,
the scope of home rule power, and the constraints imposed by state
preemption on a local government’s ability to provide solutions to local
problems. As the Constitution of the State of New York provides cities with
broad powers to create and amend laws regarding their local affairs and the
safety and well-being of their residents, this Note argues that Local Law 48
is a valid exercise of New York City’s home rule powers. Furthermore, Local
Law 48 will likely not be preempted through express, field, or conflict
preemption because of the state legislature’s failure to expressly or impliedly
state their intention to occupy the field or limit local governments from
enacting further legislation on the issue. Lastly, although Local Law 48
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establishes a limited right, it can be effective in practice to hold officers
accountable and serve as a test case for future legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Today we provide the people of New York City an important tool for
accountability when law enforcement violates their rights. It eliminates the
shield of qualified immunity to allow victims the opportunity to seek
justice.
—New York City Council Member Stephen Levin1

To address the lawless conditions and resulting abuse of formerly enslaved
people in the post–Civil War South by states and local governments
unwilling to equally enforce the law, Congress in 1871 adopted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to provide a federal remedy2 when public officials, acting under color
of law, violate an individual’s constitutional rights.3 Concerned that police
officers would have to choose between fulfilling their duties and the threat of
liability, the U.S. Supreme Court immunized officers from civil liability
through a good-faith and probable cause defense.4 This was the start of
qualified immunity, which eventually developed into an affirmative defense5
that shields police officers from liability for wrongdoing, such as use of
excessive force, and presents challenges to plaintiffs in holding officers
personally accountable.6
Qualified immunity has barred relief for people who are killed or injured
by police officers’ use of excessive force.7 However, the brutal murder of
1. Nick Sibilla, New York City Bans Qualified Immunity for Cops Who Use Excessive
Force, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2021, 10:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/
2021/04/29/new-york-city-limits-qualified-immunity-makes-it-easier-to-sue-cops-who-useexcessive-force/ [https://perma.cc/8WAV-YEJX].
2. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 173–78 (1961), overruled on other grounds
sub nom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3. JAY R. SCHWEIKERT, CATO INST., QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: A LEGAL, PRACTICAL,
AND MORAL FAILURE 3 (2020), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-09/pa-901update.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXW3-Q4UC]. Section 1983 applies only to state or local
government agents who are sued in federal courts. See What Are the Elements of a Section
1983 Claim?, THOMSON REUTERS (June 13, 2022), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/
blog/what-are-the-elements-of-a-section-1983-claim/ [https://perma.cc/T2M5-HZP7]. The
equivalent for federal agents arises under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). As this Note is focused on police officers and their
capacity as public officials, Bivens will not be further explored.
4. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967).
5. See Michael E. Beyda, Note, Affirmative Immunity: A Litigation-Based Approach to
Curb Appellate Courts’ Raising Qualified Immunity Sua Sponte, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693,
2695 (2021).
6. See Nathaniel Sobel, What Is Qualified Immunity, and What Does It Have to Do With
Police Reform?, LAWFARE (June 6, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
what-qualified-immunity-and-what-does-it-have-do-police-reform [https://perma.cc/8NF2CNCG].
7. See Cary Aspinwall & Simone Weichselbaum, Colorado Tries New Way
to Punish Rogue Cops, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020, 4:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/colorado-tries-new-way-to-punish-roguecops [https://perma.cc/QB5P-3KFA]. As stated by Anya Bidwell, an attorney at the Institute
for Justice, “[q]ualified immunity means that government officials can get away with violating
your rights as long as they violated them in a way nobody thought of before.” Nick Sibilla,
Colorado Passes Landmark Law Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to Protect
Civil Rights, FORBES (June 21, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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George Floyd, and other recent police killings, have sparked “nationwide
protests against police brutality”8 and raised concerns as to police bias and
accountability.9 As such, some have called for the end of qualified immunity
or demanded that the doctrine be reformed.10
Because it is difficult for plaintiffs to recover in federal court when their
constitutional rights are violated, approximately twenty-five states have
considered reforms to the qualified immunity doctrine at the state level, of
which four states—Colorado, New Mexico, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts—have passed legislation that removed or limited qualified
immunity as a defense.11 Although New York State (NYS) senators have
introduced bills that would create a civil right of action when an individual
is deprived of their constitutional rights and would limit available
immunities, none of these bills have been enacted.12 In contrast to the state,
on April 25, 2021, New York City (NYC) became “the first major city” to
limit police officers’ use of qualified immunity13 through Local Law 48 of
2021.14 The law creates a cause of action when police officers violate a
person’s right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and
use of excessive force, banning qualified immunity as a defense.15
Local Law 48 presents questions regarding a city’s authority to create a
cause of action and to limit immunities provided for by the state.
Historically, states limited local government’s authority to powers explicitly
“delegated to them by state law.”16 However, in the twentieth century, some
states (including New York) adopted home rule provisions—establishing the
nicksibilla/2020/06/21/colorado-passes-landmark-law-against-qualified-immunity-createsnew-way-to-protect-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/K7W7-HZB6] (quoting Anya Bidwell).
8. How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/AC7E-M9P5].
9. Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 437
(“Several recent high-profile police killings have focused national attention on longstanding
concerns about police bias, police violence, and the lack of police accountability.”); see also
Daniele Selby, New Mexico Is the Second State to Ban Qualified Immunity, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Apr. 7, 2021), https://innocenceproject.org/new-mexico-bans-qualified-immunitypolice-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/DL5E-F7YL] (“Police officers rarely face criminal
charges or even internal disciplinary measures when they engage in misconduct. When
misconduct goes unchecked, officers may continue to abuse their powers.”).
10. Emma Tucker, States Tackling ‘Qualified Immunity’ for Police as Congress
Squabbles over the Issue, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/23/politics/qualifiedimmunity-police-reform/index.html [https://perma.cc/8CH7-7G9G] (Apr. 23, 2021, 7:45
AM).
11. Id.; see also Sibilla, supra note 1. See generally infra Part I.C.
12. See S.B. 8668B, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); The Restoring Accountability
and Civil Equity Act, S.B. 8669, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); S.B. 1991, 2021–2022
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021). This Note will not further discuss these bills because none
of them have passed.
13. Sibilla, supra note 1.
14. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-801 to 8-807 (2022). This Note uses the popular
name of the uncodified version of the municipal law, Local Law 48, to refer to the ordinance.
15. Id. §§ 8-801 to 8-804.
16. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109,
1112–13 (2012). Cities were considered to have “scant inherent powers”—their ability to
regulate in certain areas limited to “a specific grant of power from the [state] legislature.” Id.
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right for cities to legislate and adopt social policies without approval from
the state legislature.17 The Constitution of the State of New York and the
New York Municipal Home Rule Law give local governments the power to
adopt and amend local laws as to their “property, affairs, or government,”
along with ten enumerated subjects.18 Under the preemption doctrine,
however, local governments cannot enact laws that conflict with the state
constitution or general law.19 Even if a local government has broad powers
to legislate, the preemption doctrine acts as a limit that enforces the state
legislature’s primacy.20
This Note examines whether Local Law 48 is a valid exercise of NYC’s
home rule powers and whether it is preempted by state law. Part I of this
Note surveys (1) the evolution of the qualified immunity doctrine; (2) NYS
immunities and defenses; and (3) legislation in Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Mexico that modify the use of qualified immunity
as a defense.
Part II discusses Local Law 48 and NYC’s authority to create such an
ordinance. Part II.A dives into what Local Law 48 does, and the debate
surrounding its enactment. Part II.B outlines the home rule powers given by
NYS to local governments, as well as state preemption.
Part III then argues that (1) Local Law 48 is a valid exercise of NYC’s
home rule power and (2) Local Law 48 is not preempted.
Lastly, Part IV discusses that although the ordinance is limited, if
administered properly, it can be an effective law in practice that will hold
police officers accountable for use of excessive force and unreasonable
searches and seizures.
I. THE RISE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE AND STATUTORY
RESPONSES BY STATES TO CREATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Section 1983 provides persons with a federal cause of action to hold public
officials liable for depriving them of the “rights, privileges, or immunities”
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and federal laws.21 However, the
Supreme Court adopted the qualified immunity doctrine to allow public
officials to raise an affirmative defense when they are sued under § 1983.22
Part I.A provides the evolution of qualified immunity starting from § 1983’s
enactment to modern cases. Part I.B discusses the doctrine of qualified
immunity and indemnification in NYS. Part I.C explores legislation enacted
by four states that limit or remove qualified immunity as a defense.

17. See id. at 1110, 1113.
18. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)–(c); see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW
§ 10(1)(ii)(a)(1)–(14) (McKinney 2022). Although section 10 lists fourteen enumerated
subjects, they are generally similar to, but are more elaborate powers than, those listed in the
state constitution.
19. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)–(ii).
20. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1977).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Beyda, supra note 5, at 2698.
22. Beyda, supra note 5, at 2695–96.
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A. An Absolute Shield: The Evolution of Qualified Immunity
While § 1983 provides plaintiffs with a cause of action for civil damages
against public officials who violate their constitutional rights,23 it remained
mostly unused24 until the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape25 allowed a
plaintiff to sue police officers under the statute.26 Monroe’s affirmation that
plaintiffs could sue officers under § 1983, however, was short lived. A mere
six years after Monroe, the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray27 voiced
concerns that police officers may have to choose between being charged for
abandoning their duty if probable cause for an arrest existed and being held
liable for damages if they did make the arrest.28 Thus, the Court articulated
a good-faith defense that eventually developed into today’s qualified
immunity doctrine in the form of the “clearly established” standard.29 As a
result, it has become increasingly difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to
overcome the qualified immunity defense with the amount of specificity
required.30
Part I.A.1 starts with a discussion of the adoption of § 1983 by Congress
and the purpose it meant to serve. Part I.A.2 discusses Monroe’s
interpretation of § 1983. Part I.A.3 analyzes the cases that shaped the
qualified immunity doctrine into what it is today.
1. The Aspirations of § 1983
The origins of qualified immunity date back to 1871 and the postwar
South.31 Various opponents resisted32 the Thirteenth Amendment’s
abolishment of slavery and involuntary servitude,33 the Fourteenth
Amendment’s grant of equal protection and citizenship to formerly enslaved
people,34 and the Fifteenth Amendment’s grant of the right to vote regardless
of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”35 One key and violent
opponent was the Ku Klux Klan, which persecuted Black citizens to prevent
them from exercising their rights, including their right to vote and run for
23. See WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB 10492, POLICING THE POLICE:
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2020).
24. Beyda, supra note 5, at 2699; see also Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Is Born: The
Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019,
1021 (2013) (noting that for many decades, § 1983 laid “largely dormant” due to “restrictive
interpretations of state action and the Fourteenth Amendment”).
25. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
26. See id. at 169–70, 187.
27. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
28. Id. at 555.
29. See NOVAK, supra note 23, at 2–3.
30. Id. at 3.
31. See Schweikert, supra note 3, at 3.
32. See The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EnforcementActs.htm
[https://perma.cc/TDR4-FRV7] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
34. Id. amend. XIV.
35. Id. amend. XV.
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public office.36 Local authorities not only failed to protect formerly enslaved
people, but would also sometimes participate in the persecution
themselves.37
Congress responded to such civil rights violations and lawless conditions38
by passing the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.39 As part of the third of
the Enforcement Acts,40 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allow
plaintiffs to sue public officials who, while acting under state or local law,
violate the plaintiff’s guaranteed rights under the Constitution and other
federal laws.41 To bring a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a
person42 acted under color of law of any state, territory, or the District of
Columbia and (2) the actions of that person deprived the plaintiff of “rights,
privileges, or immunities” guaranteed “by the Constitution and laws.”43 A
government official or employee who is found to have violated such rights
can be held personally liable for monetary damages or injunctive relief.44
36. The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, supra note 32.
37. See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 55–56 (2000).
38. Schweikert, supra note 3, at 3. The purpose of § 1983 was to fix the lawless conditions
exhibited in the southern states, as well as the “inability or unwillingness” of state actors to
guarantee equal protection of the law to citizens. Evelyn Michalos, Note, Time over Matter:
Measuring the Reasonableness of Officer Conduct in § 1983 Claims, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1031, 1037 (2020). In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court noted that a driving force behind
the Third Enforcement Act was not a lack of state remedies to deal with the lawlessness in the
South, but rather the failure of states “to enforce the laws with an equal hand.” 365 U.S. 167,
174–75 (1961), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
39. See The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, supra note 32.
40. Section 1983 is part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Schweikert, supra note 3, at 3.
The Ku Klux Klan Act is another name for the Third Enforcement Act. The Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, OFF. OF ART & ARCHIVES & OFF. OF THE CLERK,
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/hh_1871_04_20_KKK_Act/
[https://perma.cc/U7GK-MC4D] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
41. See NOVAK, supra note 23, at 2. Section 1983 does not provide citizens with new or
expanded rights; it merely provides citizens with a remedy when a clearly established right,
such as a constitutional or statutory right, is violated. See What Are the Elements of a Section
1983 Claim?, supra note 3.
42. A “person” includes state and local government actors, private actors that operate
under state authority, and, occasionally, private actors that act alone. See Michalos, supra note
38, at 1036. In Monroe, the Supreme Court decided that municipalities are not included in
§ 1983’s definition of a “person.” 365 U.S. at 191. This holding was later overruled in Monell
v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The relevant text reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Id.; see also Michalos, supra note 38, at 1037 (stating that plaintiffs must prove two essential
elements to bring § 1983 claims).
44. See § 1983; Qualified Immunity, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/qualified-immunity.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6B52-TX5F]; see also Edward C. Dawson, Replacing Monell Liability with
Qualified Immunity for Municipal Defendants in 42 U.S.C § 1983 Litigation, 86 U. CIN. L.
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Thus, through § 1983, Congress gave individuals a civil remedy to protect
themselves against states’ misuse of power.45
Although § 1983 created a cause of action for violations of a constitutional
right, nothing in § 1983’s text mentions a potential immunity defense.46 For
many years after enactment, § 1983 laid “largely dormant” until 1961, when
the Supreme Court “breathed life into the statute” in Monroe v. Pape.47
2. Statutory Interpretation of § 1983: Limiting State Powers
In Monroe, the Supreme Court allowed a § 1983 suit to proceed.48 There,
the plaintiff, Monroe, sued police officers for § 1983 damages after the
plaintiff and others were forced to stand naked while thirteen officers raided
their home without an arrest warrant.49 Monroe argued that the officers’
actions violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.50 The Court held that § 1983 provides persons with a remedy
when officials abuse their position to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,
privileges, and immunities.51
The Court considered the history and purpose of § 1983 against the
backdrop of violations in the South and established that the legislation served
three functions.52 First, § 1983 may override certain state laws because it
prohibits discriminatory laws by states.53 Second, § 1983 provides a remedy
when state law is insufficient.54 Finally, as to § 1983’s broadest purpose,
when state remedies are not an option in practice, § 1983 provides a federal
remedy.55
In reaching its decision, the Court also reaffirmed a broad interpretation of
“under color of law” that includes wrongdoing made possible due to the
official’s outward appearance of bearing state authority.56 Furthermore, the
REV. 483, 492 (2018). However, although the government employee can be held personally
liable, “the government entity virtually always pays.” Qualified Immunity, supra.
45. Michalos, supra note 38, at 1036.
46. See Schweikert, supra note 3, at 3; see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity
Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 49–50 (2018) (noting that neither the original statute nor
the version codified in the U.S. Code “makes any reference to immunity”).
47. Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Assault on Civil Rights, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-supreme-courts-quietassault-on-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/BZR7-CCN4].
48. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169–70, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds
sub nom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe arose at a
time when the nation was “increasingly focused on racial discrimination.” Nahmod, supra
note 24, at 1022. The case focused not only on § 1983, but also on actions under the
Fourteenth Amendment and on local government liability. Id.
49. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169–70.
50. See id. at 170–71.
51. Id. at 172.
52. Id. at 171–80.
53. See id. at 173.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 174. The federal remedy does not replace the state remedy—it is merely
“supplementary.” Id. at 183. It is not necessary to invoke and be refused the state remedy
before invoking the federal remedy. Id.
56. Id. at 184 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
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Court held that no specific intent to deprive an individual of their federal right
is required.57
After Monroe, § 1983 was, and continues to be, the primary method used
to enforce and protect constitutional rights.58 However, in 1967, the Supreme
Court expressed fears of the implications of holding public officials
personally liable,59 resulting in a limited immunity that later developed into
today’s qualified immunity. The next section considers the modern cases
that shaped the doctrine.
3. The Weakening of § 1983 in Modern Cases
The doctrine of qualified immunity traces its roots to Pierson v. Ray.60
Approximately six years after the Supreme Court affirmed that § 1983
creates a cause of action, the Court expressed fears that “the threat of being
held personally liable for damages” may deter public officials from doing
their job effectively.61 Although police officers are not protected by absolute
immunity, the Court posited that police officers must not be made to choose
between abandoning their duty when there is probable cause to arrest and
being punished with damages if the officer does arrest.62 Thus, the Court
held that police officers may invoke a “good faith and probable cause”
defense under § 1983.63
To reach its decision, the Court distinguished the facts in Pierson from
those in Monroe.64 In Monroe, the officers acted illegally without the
authority of any state law, and so, Monroe did not foreclose a good-faith and
probable cause defense.65 Because good faith and probable cause is a defense
for the common-law tort of false arrest, the Court determined that defendants
in comparable § 1983 suits should be able to invoke the same defense.66 As
such, a limited immunity was born.
57. Id. at 187. The Court believed that § 1983 should be construed “against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions.” Id.
58. See Adelman, supra note 47; see also Dawson, supra note 44, at 491–92.
59. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
60. See id.
61. Beyda, supra note 5, at 2699.
62. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555. The Court also considered whether a local judge could
be held liable under § 1983 for damages. See id. at 554–55. While this Note limits its scope
to consider police officers, it is important to note that the Court decided on different immunity
levels for judges and police officers. The Court found absolute immunity at common law for
judges when they act “within their judicial jurisdiction,” even if the judge is “accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly.” Id. at 554. This is “for the benefit of the public” because judges
should be free to make “principled and fearless decisionmaking.” Id. Unlike judges, there is
no “absolute and unqualified immunity” at common law for police officers. Id. at 555.
63. See id. at 557.
64. See id. at 556. Monroe did not consider immunities. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Schweikert, supra note 3, at 5; see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556–57. This defense
is subjective. In Pierson, the Court remanded for a new trial so that the jury could determine
whether the officers “reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional.” Id.
at 557–58. If the jury finds good faith, then an unconstitutional arrest does not matter and a
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Despite initially analogizing qualified immunity to common-law torts that
allowed a good faith defense, the Court eventually deserted this analogy as it
continued to develop the doctrine.67 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,68 the Court
“fundamentally changed” the standard articulated in Pierson.69 The Court in
Harlow acknowledged that determining subjective good faith would be
difficult, and the resulting discovery costs “disruptive of effective
government.”70 The Court effectively shifted from a subjective test to one
of objective reasonableness.71 Defendants no longer have to prove an actual
good-faith belief that their actions were lawful.72 Public officials performing
discretionary functions are not liable for civil damages unless they violated a
“clearly established” law or a reasonably known constitutional right.73 The
Court reasoned that an official cannot anticipate civil liability if the conduct
has not been formerly declared unlawful.74 The Court has defined “clearly
established” to require existing case law not necessarily “directly on point,”
but sufficiently similar so that “existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.”75 Without precedent establishing an
action as unconstitutional, a plaintiff will likely not succeed in their claim.76
For example, in Corbitt v. Vickers,77 when the defendant-officer fired at a
nonthreatening dog, the officer instead accidentally shot a child who was
within view and lying down per the officer’s order.78 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the officer’s qualified immunity
defense because no clearly established law made clear to the officer (or any

verdict for the officers would stand. See id. Thus, defendants must have a good-faith belief
that their actions were lawful. Schweikert, supra note 3, at 6.
67. See Schweikert, supra note 3, at 5.
68. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow considered the qualified immunity doctrine in the
context of two White House aides charged with violating respondent’s constitutional and
statutory rights. See id. at 802. Although Harlow does not involve § 1983, the Court implied
that the standard articulated in Harlow for federal officials applies to suits under § 1983
involving state officials. See id. at 818 n.30.
69. Schweikert, supra note 3, at 6.
70. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–17. In particular, the Court emphasized “broad-ranging
discovery” costs and concerns that inquiries into “judgments surrounding discretionary
action” would be “influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences, values, and emotions.” Id.
71. Id. at 818. The objective reasonableness standard marks a departure from a “common
law interpretation” to a standard that officials must “know the law.” Jim Hilbert, Improving
Police Officer Accountability in Minnesota: Three Proposed Legislative Reforms, 47
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 222, 254 (2021).
72. See Schweikert, supra note 3, at 6.
73. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
74. See id. at 818–19. However, the clearly established standard is not a “license” for
“lawless conduct.” Id. at 819. A person injured by conduct the official “could be expected to
know . . . violate[s] statutory or constitutional rights . . . may have a cause of action.” Id.
75. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Sobel, supra note 6 (“[T]he
court has generally required plaintiffs to point to an already existing judicial decision, with
substantially similar facts.”).
76. See Sobel, supra note 6.
77. 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 110 (2020) (mem.).
78. See id. at 1308.
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reasonable officer) that he would violate the Fourth Amendment if he fired
at the dog and accidentally shot the child.79
Twenty years after Harlow, in Saucier v. Katz,80 the Supreme Court
established a two-step analysis for the qualified immunity defense.81 Under
the first step, a court considers whether the alleged facts demonstrate that a
public official violated the injured party’s constitutional rights.82 If the
answer is no, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. 83 But if the
answer is yes, then step two inquires whether the official’s conduct violated
clearly established law.84 If the official was not on notice that the conduct
was unlawful, then qualified immunity applies and a court may award
summary judgment for the official.85
Nine years later, in Pearson v. Callahan,86 the Supreme Court stated that
it is not mandatory to strictly follow the order of the two-step process set
forth in Saucier.87 Lower courts may decide which of the two Saucier steps
to address first to prevent unnecessary litigation by forcing parties to litigate
the constitutional question first when the facts may not violate a clearly
established right.88
By narrowing the power of § 1983 and creating the qualified immunity
doctrine, the Court has (1) made it difficult for plaintiffs to seek relief for
constitutional rights violations, even if the conduct is extreme and egregious,
and (2) failed to protect the purpose of § 1983 as a vehicle that limits state
power by guaranteeing basic federal rights.89 The next section explores
NYS’s qualified immunity doctrine and available defenses and immunities.
B. NYS Defenses and Immunities for Police Officers
Although qualified immunity protects officials only under a federal cause
of action, a similar doctrine exists under New York common law.90 NYS
courts generally refer to this type of immunity as “governmental immunity”
and apply it to discretionary actions taken by a public official in carrying out
79. Id. at 1323.
80. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
81. See id. at 201.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 201–02.
86. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
87. See id. at 236.
88. See id. at 236–37.
89. See Hilbert, supra note 71, at 241–42; see also Schweikert, supra note 3, at 10. In
Kisela v. Hughes, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the Court’s trend of reversing orders that
deny officers qualified immunity but rarely intervening when officers are wrongfully awarded
the doctrine’s protection. 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This
approach has “transform[ed] the doctrine into an absolute shield” that effectively “gut[s] the
deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment” and sends officers the signal that “they can shoot
first and think later.” Id.
90. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Biswas v. City
of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“New York common law
provides for analogous qualified immunity.”).
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their governmental duties.91 Public officials thus face no liability if the act
that led to the wrongdoing was in the “exercise of discretionary authority.”92
The purpose of governmental immunity is to advance the state’s interest in
ensuring that government officials can carry out their official duties without
fear of being held civilly liable for causing public harm.93 Summary
judgment is appropriate under state law if a defendant is entitled to a qualified
immunity defense under federal law.94
Public employees also have defenses and indemnification in civil actions
under local and state law. For example, New York General Municipal Law
section 50-k95 governs civil actions against NYC employees.96 It outlines
the availability of and restrictions on indemnification, as well as the defenses
available to city employees under state and federal law.97 Under section
50-k(3), employees must be indemnified for judgments entered against them,
in both state and federal court, if the act or omission that led to the alleged
violation (1) is done “within the scope of [their] public employment,” (2) is
done while performing their duties, (3) does not violate any rule or regulation
of the employee’s agency, and (4) is not intentionally wrongful or reckless.98
Section 50-k(9) explicitly states that nothing under section 50-k modifies or
limits any immunities, defenses, or indemnification available to city
employees or employees in “any other level of government” under “state,
federal or local law or common law.”99 The generality of this provision,
along with state and federal case law, implies the inclusion of qualified
immunity in state law. Furthermore, New York Public Officers Law section
17100 closely mirrors section 50-k. Section 17(3)(a) provides that the state
must indemnify state employees for judgments against them if the
employee’s action was within their employment duties, provided that the
injury in question did not result from the employee’s intentional

91. See, e.g., Valdez v. City of New York, 960 N.E.2d 356, 361 (N.Y. 2011); see also
Council Votes to End Qualified Immunity and Seven Other Measures to Reform NYPD, N.Y.C.
COUNCIL (Mar. 25, 2021), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2021/03/25/2079/ [https://perma.cc/
JJ4V-FE4F] (“New York courts have created their own version of the federal doctrine of
qualified immunity, which shields police officers who are performing discretionary functions
from civil liability.”).
92. Valdez, 960 N.E.2d at 362. “Discretionary acts” are defined as “conduct involving
the exercise of reasoned judgment.” Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184, 187 (N.Y.
2000).
93. See Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990) (“Whether
absolute or qualified, this immunity reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a
member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free
to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions . . . outweighs the benefits to be
had from imposing liability for that injury.”).
94. See Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 87.
95. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2022).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id. § 50-k(3).
99. Id. § 50-k(9).
100. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17 (McKinney 2022).
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wrongdoing.101 Section 17(9) also affirms that section 17 does not limit any
defenses available under all levels of government to state employees or
employees of “any other level of government.”102 Both the General
Municipal Law and Public Officers Law apply to claims under § 1983.103
Even if a defendant is not entitled to immunities, including qualified
immunity, indemnification by employers or the city is widespread.
According to Professor Joanna C. Schwartz of the UCLA School of Law,
“officers are virtually always indemnified even if they have been disciplined,
terminated, or criminally prosecuted” for their conduct.104 NYC is a prime
example of this, as it frequently indemnifies police officers, even when their
conduct was egregious.105 If the employee intentionally committed such
wrongdoing or was reckless in their behavior, the city may still choose to
indemnify the employee, as the statute merely states that there is no
mandatory duty to represent and indemnify.106 Thus, while civil litigation
“[a]t worst . . . ‘punishes’” an officer by forcing them to testify under oath,
be cross-examined, and face public scrutiny, it is also ineffective in holding
officers accountable because officers rarely “pay anything out of their own
pockets” for judgments or settlements.107
To summarize, qualified immunity is available as a defense in state courts,
generally through state law, and police officers are often indemnified by their
employers. The next section considers laws enacted by four states to hold
police officers accountable for wrongdoing.
C. States Reform the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
The outrage and anger following George Floyd’s murder empowered
various state legislatures to seek to tackle the qualified immunity doctrine.108
However, many of these attempts “withered,”109 and only four states have

101. Id. § 17(3)(a). Unlike section 50-k, section 17(3)(a) does not mention reckless
conduct, only intentional wrongdoing. See id.
102. Id. § 17(9).
103. See GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(2); PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2).
104. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 925–26 (2014).
For example, in forty-four of the largest U.S. jurisdictions, “of the approximately 9225 civil
rights damages actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor,” officers only financially contributed to
about 0.41 percent of those judgments between 2006 and 2011. Id. at 890. This “amounted to
just .02% of the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases.” Id.
105. See Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter
Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 587–88 (2000).
106. See id. at 591; GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(3) (stating that “the duty to indemnify and save
harmless . . . shall not arise where the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing
or recklessness on the part of the employee”).
107. Emery & Maazel, supra note 105, at 589–90.
108. See Kimberly Kindy, Dozens of States Have Tried to End Qualified Immunity. Police
Officers and Unions Helped Beat Nearly Every Bill., WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/qualified-immunity-police-lobbying-statelegislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2NUK-5CPV].
109. Id.
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passed legislation that restricts or ends qualified immunity as a defense.110 It
is necessary to explicitly restrict the doctrine; where § 1983 state analogues
are enacted, state courts have generally embraced a state version of “federal
qualified immunity,” even when the statute is silent on immunity. 111 For
example, in Rodriques v. Furtado,112 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found that an officer was immunized because, in enacting the state’s
civil rights act, the state legislature adopted the same immunity standard
developed under § 1983.113 In this case, the officer obtained a warrant to
search the plaintiff’s vagina for drugs.114 Although the officers that searched
the plaintiff’s apartment did not find any drugs, she was taken to a hospital
where medical staff forcibly held her down to search her vagina.115 Nothing
was found.116 The plaintiff argued that she was deprived of her constitutional
right “to be free from unreasonable searches” under Massachusetts’s state
constitution.117 The court stated: “We cannot say that a reasonable police
officer in [this] position would have known that the search of the plaintiff’s
vagina violated constitutional rights which were clearly established at the
time of the search.”118
The next four sections review the way in which four states have limited
qualified immunity for state courts.119
1. Colorado’s Accountability Act
On June 19, 2020, in honor of Juneteenth, Colorado governor Jared Polis
signed into law a “sweeping” reform bill, SB 20-217,120 making Colorado
110. See Tucker, supra note 10; see also Sibilla, supra note 1. Although Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Mexico mark recent attempts to limit the qualified
immunity doctrine, Ohio, for example, eliminated immunities generally in 2003 for employees
who act outside of the scope of their employment or maliciously or recklessly. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(a)–(b) (West 2022). Furthermore, some state courts have also
“interpreted their state constitutions, statutes, and common law to narrow or eliminate
qualified immunity.” Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and
Federalism, 109 GEO L.J. 229, 297 (2020).
111. Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (June 22, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
colorado-passes-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminate-qualified-immunity
[https://perma.cc/GBL6-TC5Y].
112. 575 N.E.2d 1124 (Mass. 1991).
113. Id. at 1127
114. Id. at 1126.
115. Id. at 1126–27.
116. Id. at 1127.
117. Id. at 1126.
118. Id. at 1128.
119. While the state laws provide a wide range of protections and requirements, the
following sections will be limited to discussing what is protected, who is covered, what
defenses and immunities are available, and applicable statutes of limitations. Furthermore, in
text, this Note refers to the enacted state bills, except for Massachusetts, by their legislative
names but cites to the enacted statute.
120. Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act, S.B. 20-217, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2020); see also Sibilla, supra note 7. This bill passed “with overwhelming bipartisan
support” in both the Colorado House of Representatives and Senate. Schweikert, supra note
111.
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the first state to explicitly ban qualified immunity as a defense.121 About one
year later, HB 21-1250122 was enacted to clarify and address unresolved
issues related to SB 20-217.
SB 20-217 creates a state civil cause of action for deprivation of rights.123
Like § 1983, the act permits plaintiffs to bring a civil action against a peace
officer124 who, “under color of law,” deprived the plaintiff of their
individually guaranteed state constitutional rights.125 Peace officers who fail
to intervene when a person is deprived of these rights can also be held liable
for harms to the injured party.126 SB 20-217 broadly encompasses “all
violations of the Colorado Bill of Rights,” but only permits civil lawsuits
against peace officers.127
Furthermore, as to claims brought under the newly created civil action,
statutory immunities, limitations on liability,128 and qualified immunity as a
“defense to liability” do not apply.129 Even so, peace officers are not
individually liable. A peace officer who has a judgment or settlement entered
against them pursuant to this statute must be indemnified by their employer
unless the officer acted without “good faith and reasonable belief that the
action was lawful.”130 In this scenario, the officer is responsible for the lesser
of either “five percent of the judgment or settlement or twenty-five thousand
dollars.”131 The officer’s employer or insurance must pay the full settlement
or judgment if the officer is unable to pay.132 There is no duty to indemnify
if the officer is convicted for a criminal violation unless the employer,
“through its action or inaction,” contributed to the violation.133 The statute
of limitations is two years after the cause of action accrues.134

121. Schweikert, supra note 111 (“Colorado is not the first state to enact a ‘state analogue’
to Section 1983, but it is the first state to specifically negate the availability of qualified
immunity as a defense through legislation.”); see also Sibilla, supra note 7.
122. Measures to Address Law Enforcement Accountability, H.B. 21-1250, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
123. S.B. 20-217, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020). For the enacted statute,
see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131 (2022).
124. “Peace officer” includes police officers, sheriffs, and state patrol officers. COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-31-901(3), 16-2.5-102 (2022).
125. Id. § 13-21-131(1). While § 1983 allows individuals to sue for damages in federal
court when their federal constitutional rights are violated, SB 20-217 allows individuals to sue
in a state court when their state constitutional rights are violated. Schweikert, supra note 111.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(1) (2022).
127. Nick Sibilla, New Mexico Bans Qualified Immunity for All Government Workers,
Including Police, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/
2021/04/07/new-mexico-prohibits-qualified-immunity-for-all-government-workersincluding-police/ [https://perma.cc/3B33-HW4Y].
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(2)(a) (2022).
129. Id. § 13-21-131(2)(b).
130. Id. § 13-21-131(4)(a). The requirement of good faith and reasonable belief for
indemnification is reminiscent of limited immunity at common law, as discussed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Pierson. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(4)(a) (2022).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 13-21-131(5).
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2. Connecticut Expands Police Officers’ Liability
Although Connecticut did not ban qualified immunity, on July 31, 2020,
Connecticut limited police officers’ legal immunity through HB 6004.135
Prior to this bill, police officers could be sued for specific constitutional
violations.136 This right was established in Binette v. Sabo,137 in which the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that plaintiffs can seek monetary damages
under a private cause of action for violations of article I, sections 7 and 9 of
the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.138 While section 7 protects
against unreasonable searches or seizures, section 9 protects against
detainment or punishment unless “clearly warranted by law.”139 State
officers and employees are immune from personal liability for damages that
occur within the “discharge of [their] duties or within the scope of [their]
employment” if their conduct is not “wanton, reckless, or malicious.”140
Effective July 1, 2021, HB 6004 created a new law that expands police
officers’ liability: “No police officer, acting alone or in conspiracy with
another,” can deprive a person of their rights under state law or article I of
the state constitution.141 Additionally, if officer A witnesses officer B use
what officer A “objectively knows to be unreasonable, excessive or illegal
use of force,” then officer A must both report and intervene.142
Unlike Colorado’s SB 20-217, Connecticut’s HB 6004 does not
specifically mention qualified immunity. It addresses governmental
immunity generally,143 limiting it to damages claims in which police officers
“had an objectively good faith belief” that their conduct “did not violate the
law.”144 There is no governmental immunity for equitable relief.145 Still,
police officers are not personally liable. Unless the officer’s act was
“malicious, wanton, or wilful,” the law enforcement unit or municipality
135. H.B. 6004, 2020 Gen. Assemb., July Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2020); Nick Sibilla, New
Connecticut Law Limits Police Immunity in Civil Rights Lawsuits, but Loopholes Remain,
FORBES (July 31, 2020, 9:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/07/31/newconnecticut-law-limits-police-immunity-in-civil-rights-lawsuits-but-loopholes-remain/
[https://perma.cc/E8D8-76BH]. For the enacted statute, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-571k (West 2022).
136. See Sibilla, supra note 135.
137. 710 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1998).
138. Id. at 689.
139. CONN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 7, 9.
140. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165(a) (West 2022).
141. Id. § 52-571k(b). The term “police officer” includes members of the local police
department, constables in criminal law enforcement, special policemen, or members of law
enforcement “who perform[] police duties.” Id. § 7-294a(9).
142. Id. § 7-282e(a)(1) to (2).
143. See id. § 52-571k(d)(1). Connecticut courts refer to “qualified immunity” as
“governmental immunity.” See What Is Qualified Immunity, ACLU CONN. (July 22, 2020,
12:00 PM), https://www.acluct.org/en/news/what-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/
8BWD-BNRQ].
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571k(d)(1) (West 2022). Like Colorado’s SB 20-217,
Connecticut’s HB 6004 is different from the U.S. Supreme Court’s current immunity standard,
which cares not for good faith but whether the officer violated clearly established law. See
supra notes 68–76.
145. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571k(d)(1) (West 2022).
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must protect the officer from “financial loss and expense.”146 Plaintiffs may
recover court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees only if the violation was
“deliberate, wilful or committed with reckless indifference.”147 Plaintiffs
must commence their claim within one year of when their right was
violated.148
Officers are authorized to use force, including deadly force and
chokeholds, under very specific conditions, some of which require a
reasonable belief that force is necessary to arrest or for self-defense.149
3. Massachusetts Narrowly Removes Immunities for Decertified Officers
Massachusetts, like Connecticut, also did not outright ban qualified
immunity. Instead, on December 31, 2020, Massachusetts reformed police
standards by limiting law enforcement officers’ legal immunity through
SB 2963,150 which amends Massachusetts General Law sections 11H and 11I
on constitutional violations.151 Both sections set out a civil cause of action
for persons whose constitutional rights are violated, but actions under section
11H are to be brought by the attorney general, whereas actions under section
11I are to be brought by aggrieved persons.152 Massachusetts permits
individuals to sue persons, including law enforcement officers, who violate
their federal and state constitutional rights only if the person used or
attempted to use “threats, intimidation or coercion.”153 Quite notably,
Massachusetts, unlike Colorado and Connecticut, does not limit its protection
to rights in its state constitution, but also protects rights secured under the
U.S. Constitution.154
Originally, section 11H made no mention of immunity. 155 Section 11H
has since been amended (through SB 2963) to assert that no law enforcement
officer156 will have immunity from civil liability if they engaged in conduct
that violates an individual’s right under state law to be free of biased policing,
provided that such conduct led to the officer’s decertification.157 However,
if an officer knowingly or unreasonably interferes with an individual’s rights
under the federal and state constitutions and laws through use or attempted
use of “threat, intimidation or coercion,” then section 11H does not grant the

146. Id. § 52-571k(e).
147. See id. § 52-571k(f).
148. See id. § 52-571k(g).
149. See id. § 53a-22.
150. S.B. 2963, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2020).
151. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H(a)(1)–11I (2022).
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id. § 11H (2021).
156. “Law enforcement officer” is defined as “any officer of an agency,” including “special
state police officer[s],” special sheriffs “performing police duties,” deputy sheriffs, constables
who arrest, and so forth. Id. ch. 6E, § 1 (2022).
157. See id. ch. 12, § 11H(b).
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officer immunity from civil liability.158 Unlike other states’ laws, SB 2963
makes no mention of indemnification.159
Available relief for constitutional violations under sections 11H and 11I
includes an injunction or any other “appropriate equitable relief.”160
Plaintiffs asserting a constitutional violation under section 11I must
commence their claim within three years of the violation occurring, as per
limits imposed on civil rights actions.161
4. New Mexico’s Statutory Cause of Action Against Government Officials
On April 7, 2021, Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham signed the New
Mexico Civil Rights Act, HB 4, into law,162 making New Mexico the second
state to completely ban the use of qualified immunity for state constitutional
violations.163 HB 4 allows a person deprived of their rights under the state’s
bill of rights to sue in the state’s district court and recover damages, equitable
relief, or injunctive relief.164 New Mexico’s bill is inclusive in that it applies
to a public body or person who acts under color of, or within, a public body’s
authority.165 “Public body” includes state or local government, agencies or
entities created by New Mexico’s state constitution, and branches of
government that “receive[] public funding,” such as school districts.166 Thus,
unlike the laws in Colorado, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, which limit
liability to police officers and officers in similar capacities, HB 4 “applies to
all government officials.”167
HB 4 also bans qualified immunity as a defense, provided that (1) the
plaintiff seeks relief or damages pursuant to the New Mexico Civil Rights
Act; (2) the public body or person acted either under color of authority or
within a public body’s authority; and (3) the public body or person deprived
the plaintiff of their state constitutional “rights, privileges or immunities.”168
Still, a police officer would not be personally liable.169 All claims must be
158. Id.
159. See generally S.B. 2963, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2020).
160. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H(a)(1) (2022).
161. See id. ch. 260, § 5B.
162. New Mexico Civil Rights Act, H.B. 4, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021); Press
Release, Off. of the Governor Michelle Lujan, Gov. Lujan Grisham Ratifies Civil Rights Act
(Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.governor.state.nm.us/2021/04/07/gov-lujan-grisham-ratifiescivil-rights-act/ [https://perma.cc/S95Z-EAZ7]. For the statute, see N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4A-1 to 41-4A-13 (2022).
163. Selby, supra note 9.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-3(B) (2022).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 41-4A-2.
167. New Mexico Ends Qualified Immunity for Abusive Police, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE
(Apr. 9, 2021), https://eji.org/news/new-mexico-ends-qualified-immunity-for-abusive-police/
[https://perma.cc/7A2H-HWWK].
168. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-4 (2022). Sovereign immunity is also not available as a
defense for New Mexico civil rights claims. Id. § 41-4A-9. However, “judicial immunity,
legislative immunity or any other constitutional, statutory or common law immunity” may still
be invoked. Id. § 41-4A-10.
169. See id. § 41-4A-3(C).

2022]

WITHIN A CITY’S LIMITS

895

brought against the public body;170 employers are held “vicariously liable”
for their employee’s conduct.171 Unlike Colorado’s bill, HB 4 does not
explicitly address whether an individual who did not act within the scope of
a public body’s authority could be held personally liable by a plaintiff.172
Upon enactment, liability was capped at two million dollars, with the
maximum recovery increasing as the cost of living increases.173
Claimants must bring claims under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act
within three years of the alleged unlawful conduct unless state law provides
for “a longer statute of limitations.”174
II. LOCAL LAW 48: THE CITY’S HOME RULE POWERS AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF STATE PREEMPTION
In line with the push for police reform that followed the murder of George
Floyd, local governments have made efforts to deal with police
accountability while the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to reassess the federal
qualified immunity doctrine.175 The New York City Council passed Local
Law 48 in 2021 to remove the qualified immunity barrier from suits against
officers for use of excessive force and/or unlawful searches and seizures.176
As the first city to join four states in creating a cause of action to hold officers
accountable, it raises questions of whether such legislation is within the city’s
home rule power,177 and whether Local Law 48 is preempted by NYS law on
the immunities, defenses, and indemnification available to state and city
employees.178 Part II.A analyzes Local Law 48, with Part II.A.1 explaining
the law and Part II.A.2 summarizing what various groups have said about the
law. Part II.B explores the breadth of home rule powers, and Part II.C
discusses the limits posed by the preemption doctrine on home rule.
A. NYC Local Law 48
Through Local Law 48, NYC curtailed qualified immunity and provided
plaintiffs with a cause of action when their rights are violated.179 Although
Local Law 48 is narrowly tailored to apply only to police officers who use
excessive force or engage in unreasonable searches and seizures while acting

170. Id. For judgments awarded under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act against a person
who acts “under color of or within the . . . scope” of a public body’s authority, the person will
be indemnified by the public body. Id. § 41-4A-8.
171. Sibilla, supra note 127.
172. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-1 to 41-4A-13 (2022).
173. Id. § 41-4A-6.
174. Id. § 41-4A-7.
175. See James Craven, New York City Council Passes Qualified Immunity Reform, CATO
INST. (Mar. 31, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/nyc-council-passes-qualifiedimmunity-reform-bill-bolstering-citizens-fourth-amendment-rights [https://perma.cc/AU4UAULQ].
176. See Sibilla, supra note 1.
177. See infra Part II.B.
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-803 to 8-804 (2022).
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under color of law,180 the ordinance has faced questions as to its
effectiveness and legality. Part II.A.1 discusses the scope of Local Law 48
and Part II.A.2 outlines various opinions on the ordinance pre-enactment.
1. A Right of Security
On April 25, 2021, Local Law 48, which amends NYC’s administrative
code to create a civil action for unreasonable searches and seizures and the
use of excessive force, was enacted.181 Thus, NYC became the “first major
city” to join four states in creating a law that either ends or limits qualified
immunity following the murder of George Floyd.182
Local Law 48 grants natural persons security against excessive force
independent of whether such force was used in the context of a search or
seizure.183 It creates a civil action for the deprivation of rights that is similar
but not analogous to § 1983 actions. A “covered individual” who deprives a
person of rights guaranteed under section 8-802(a) of the New York City
Administrative Code, while acting under color of law, can be held liable to
the aggrieved person for relief.184 This is a limited right, as the law only
provides individuals security against unreasonable searches and seizures and
the use of excessive force.185 Furthermore, a “covered individual” is defined
under section 8-801 of the New York City Administrative Code to mean
either (1) a police department employee or (2) a person appointed as a special
patrolman.186 No other type of officers are covered. However, employers
also face liability. Employers are liable for the actions of their employees
when the employee (1) acts under color of law and (2) deprives a natural
person of the rights guaranteed to them in section 8-802.187 Failure to
intervene for a violation of a protected right can also result in liability for the
employee and the employer.188 Per section 8-807 of the New York City
Administrative Code, the rights guaranteed under the law against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the use of excessive force are to be
interpreted “in the same manner” as the rights granted under (1) the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, (2) article I, sections

180. Id. §§ 8-802 to 8-803.
181. Int. 2220-2021, N.Y.C COUNCIL, https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.
aspx?ID=4771043&GUID=32ED0C83-7506-45F9-81AA-F5144FCA193A
[https://perma.cc/D6ZY-6GNM] (click “20. Local Law 48”) (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
182. Sibilla, supra note 1.
183. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-802 (2022).
184. Id. § 8-803(a). The full text reads:
A covered individual who, under color of any law, ordinance, rule, regulation,
custom or usage, subjects or causes to be subjected, including through failure to
intervene, any other natural person to the deprivation of any right that is created,
granted or protected by section 8-802 is liable to the person aggrieved for legal or
equitable relief or any other appropriate relief.
Id.
185. Id. § 8-802.
186. Id. § 8-801.
187. Id. § 8-803(b).
188. Id. § 8-803(a)–(b).
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6 and 12 of New York’s state constitution, and (3) section 8 of New York’s
civil rights law.189
A person need not exhaust all remedies before commencing a claim under
section 8-803 of the New York City Administrative Code.190 Pursuing a
private cause of action under the ordinance will also not interfere with claims
the plaintiff may assert “under common law or pursuant to any other law or
rule.”191 Similarly, available remedies include those under Local Law 48
and all applicable remedies under common law or any other law.192 Like
Colorado and New Mexico, Local Law 48 explicitly states that qualified
immunity is not a defense, but the law also removes “any other substantially
equivalent immunity.”193 Notably, when determining officer liability or the
applicability of qualified immunity, the law is silent as to whether there must
be either an intent to deprive or reckless conduct that deprives an individual
of their rights.194
Relief available to a prevailing plaintiff under section 8-805 of the New
York City Administrative Code includes (1) a choice between compensatory
damages, with courts having discretion to also impose punitive damages, or
liquidated damages of one thousand dollars; (2) attorneys’ fees and court
costs; and (3) a restraint on the covered individual “from engaging in further
conduct in violation of such section.”195 There is no elaboration as to how
long the restraint would last, nor any indication that the covered individual
would be removed from their employment, as “restraint” refers only to
continued engagement in unlawful conduct.196 Plaintiffs must commence
their section 8-803 civil action claim within three years of the “alleged
deprivation of a right created, granted or protected by section 8-802,”
implying that the law is not retroactive.197
Local Law 48 does not refer to the indemnification of police officers.198
Although former Mayor Bill de Blasio stated in an interview that officers will
not be held personally liable,199 this contrasts with the plain text of the

189. Id. § 8-807; see also Craven, supra note 175. By holding both the officer and the
police department liable, the law incentivizes good behavior as police departments will not
want the risk of litigation for bad officers, and officers will not want to be the center of
litigation. See id. It also ensures that an aggrieved plaintiff is still able to recover when the
defendant-officer is unable to pay a damage award by holding employers liable. Id.
190. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-803(d) (2022).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 8-804; see also supra notes 128–29, 168.
194. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-803 to § 8-804 (2022).
195. Id. § 8-805(a)(1) to (3).
196. See generally id.
197. Id. § 8-806. This interpretation is consistent with the last version of the bill posted on
the New York City Council website, which explicitly states that only violations on or after the
effective date fall under Local Law 48. See Int. 2220-2021, supra note 181.
198. See generally N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-801 to 8-807 (2022).
199. Luke Barr, New York City Moves to End Qualified Immunity, Making It the 1st City
in US to Do So, ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2021, 4:47 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/yorkcity-moves-end-qualified-immunity-making-1st/story?id=76752098 [https://perma.cc/B3ULAGL9].
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legislation. Under section 8-803, an injured person may sue an officer under
subsection (a) and the officer’s employer under subsection (b).200 Local Law
48 also amends section 7-114(b) of the New York City Administrative Code:
civil actions filed against a covered individual should include information on
the resolution of the action, including payment to the injured party “by a
covered individual or an employer or other person paying on behalf of a
covered individual.”201 If officers cannot be held personally liable or are
indemnified, then the text related to a covered individual’s liability is
superfluous. Furthermore, the first draft of the bill, Introduction No. 2220
(“Int. 2220”), contained an indemnification provision.202 Under that
provision, officers were personally liable for either “the lesser of $25,000 or
5 percent of the amount of such judgment or settlement.”203 Neither the
employer nor the city can indemnify the officer for that portion unless (1) the
officer is unable to pay the required amount, and (2) the city or employee
would “have been required or reasonably likely to indemnify.”204 The
indemnification provision also directly acknowledged General Municipal
Law section 50-k and enforced personal liability on officers in spite of
section 50-k.205 Its exclusion from the enacted law indicates the New York
City Council’s intent not to indemnify police officers or limit officers’
personal liability to the amounts previously stated.
2. Hearing Testimonies: Reception of Local Law 48 Pre-enactment
The pre-enactment bill, Int. 2220,206 garnered a wide range of arguments
for and against the ordinance, raising traditional arguments in support of
qualified immunity and questions as to the authority of local governments.
One contention is that Int. 2220 shows a lack of understanding and
misguided assumptions as to qualified immunity.207 Qualified immunity is
not an absolute immunity; officers are not shielded when they intentionally
violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.208 The doctrine does not preclude
200. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-803(a) to (b) (2022).
201. Id. § 7-114(b)(1) to (3).
202. See generally Int. 2220-2021, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4771043&GUID=32ED0C83-7506-45F9-81AAF5144FCA193A [https://perma.cc/D6ZY-6GNM] (click “3. Int. No. 2220”) (last visited Nov.
7, 2022).
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id.
205. Id. (“Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in section 50-k of the general
municipal law or any other provision of law, a covered individual . . . [will] be personally
liable for a portion of such judgment or settlement . . . .”).
206. These arguments were brought forth during a hearing before Local Law 48 was
enacted. The version discussed is Int. 2220, which contains a few differences from the enacted
version. For this section only, I will be referring to the ordinance as Int. 2220.
207. See Int. 2220-2021, N.Y.C COUNCIL, https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legislation
Detail.aspx?ID=4771043&GUID=32ED0C83-7506-45F9-81AA-F5144FCA193A
[https://perma.cc/D6ZY-6GNM] (click “8. Hearing Testimony 2/16/2021”) (last visited Nov.
7, 2022) (testimony of Benny Boscio Jr., president of the Corrections Officers’ Benevolent
Association).
208. Id.
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a criminal prosecution or bar recovery in civil actions when a clearly
established right is violated.209 Qualified immunity also protects officers
carrying out their duties.210 To remove the defense is to allow frivolous suits
to proceed and force officers who risk their lives to undergo civil suits for
carrying out their job functions.211 This is a traditional argument most
analogous to the justifications provided by the Supreme Court as it developed
the federal qualified immunity doctrine.212
Int. 2220 also appears to create various conflicts with established
structures. First, the ordinance “ignores” that the New York City Office of
the Corporation Counsel represents officers in suits and often chooses to
settle cases before trial.213 The ordinance, by placing personal liability on
officers, would require officers to pay a settlement they had no part in
negotiating, effectively creating a “statute-based conflict of interest” between
lawyer and client.214 Second, Int. 2220 is “unenforceable” because state law
preempts it.215 General Municipal Law section 50-k, mirroring Public
Officers Law section 17, requires that public employees be indemnified for
judgments entered against them.216 By making police officers personally
liable,217 the ordinance “attempts to effectively amend [General Municipal
Law section] 50-k and subvert the will of the legislature.”218 It interferes
with the state legislature’s authority by stepping into an area of law the state
intends to occupy.219

209. Id.
210. Id. (“Our members cannot be expected to put their lives on the line and carry out their
responsibilities . . . only to subject themselves to civil liabilities simply for doing their jobs.”).
211. Id.; see also id. (testimony of Paul DiGiacomo, president of Detectives’ Endowment
Association, Inc.) (“Int. 2220 will only serve to embolden the criminal element by providing
the ability to use the threat of frivolous lawsuits against law enforcement Officers to
discourage them from carrying out their duties.”).
212. See supra notes 60–63.
213. See Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207 (testimony of Paul DiGiacomo).
214. Id.
215. Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207 (Memorandum in Opposition to Introduction No. 2220
from the Police Benevolent Association).
216. See id.; see also supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
217. The hearing took place before the indemnification provision was removed from
Int. 2220. As stated previously, initial drafts of Int. 2220 did not permit officers to be
indemnified for a specified amount. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. The
Police Benevolent Association also argued against Int. 2220’s allowance of punitive damages.
Generally, courts are not permitted to award punitive damages against municipalities because
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter, two goals that cannot be advanced
when the taxpayers and citizens bear the cost of that punishment. Int. 2220-2021, supra note
207 (Memorandum in Opposition to Introduction No. 2220 from the Police Benevolent
Association). In the enacted law, if silence regarding indemnification indicates that the city
means to hold officers personally liable for the full amount of the judgment entered against
them, then the punitive damages argument does not apply.
218. Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207 (Memorandum in Opposition to Introduction No. 2220
from the Police Benevolent Association).
219. Id. A similar argument could be made for the ordinance’s removal of qualified and
relevant immunities, which may conflict with General Municipal Law section 50-k(9). See
supra Parts I.B, II.A.1 and accompanying text.
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Opponents also raised policy arguments for why Int. 2220 should be
rejected. The ordinance “creates no new substantive” right because the right
of action that the ordinance created under section 8-802 is already secured
under the Fourth Amendment and enforceable via a § 1983 claim or a “state
Constitutional tort claim.”220 The ordinance serves no purpose other than to
punish officers.221 The removal of qualified immunity as a defense, the threat
of a punitive damages award, and the possibility of officers being held
personally liable show the punitive components of the ordinance and place
enormous burdens on officers at a time when violent crime is rampant in
NYC.222 The ordinance effectively “creates a strict liability offense” as even
good faith is not a defense, causing “uncertainty” for officers.223
Lastly, while some groups emphasized that Int. 2220 is a great step
forward, they also acknowledged that the ordinance is too narrow, failing to
hold officers properly accountable for the myriad of Fourth Amendment
violations officers engage in.224
B. The State of Affairs in New York: Home Rule and Preemption
To appreciate the issue of a local government creating an ordinance that
restricts defenses available to police officers, it is important to understand the
state of affairs in NYS. Local governmental authority was initially limited
to that “delegated to them by state law”225 until twentieth century reforms
granted cities a “permanent source” of power.226 Through the state
constitution, NYC is given broad powers to create and amend laws as to its
local affairs.227 Part II.B.1 analyzes the development of home rule powers
and determines what power local governments, such as NYC, have to enact
and amend laws. Part II.B.2 then reviews the constraints posed by the
preemption doctrine.
1. The Development of Home Rule Powers: Can NYC Create a
Cause of Action?
Although states can create state law to hold officers accountable,228 what
power does a city have to do the same? The “federal Constitution is silent”

220. Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207 (Memorandum in Opposition to Introduction No. 2220
from the Police Benevolent Association).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207, at 3 (testimony of Chelsea Davis, chief strategy officer
at the Office of the First Deputy Mayor).
224. See id. at 5–6 (testimony of Michael Sisitzky of the New York Civil Liberties Union);
see also id. at 12–13 (testimony of the Legal Aid Society) (stating that Int. 2220 should
encompass more state and federal constitutional rights, include corrections officers, and
impose municipal liability).
225. Diller, supra note 16, at 1112–13.
226. Id. at 1113.
227. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c).
228. See Hilbert, supra note 71, at 257 (“States have the power to restore the original
promise of § 1983 by creating an equivalent statute under state law.”); see also Sibilla, supra
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on the authority of local governments.229 As a result, for much of the
nineteenth century, states controlled local governments, which were viewed
as subordinate to the state.230 This is known as “Dillon’s Rule.” The powers
that a local government could exercise were limited to only that which the
state explicitly delegated.231
Local governments had “no inherent
lawmaking authority.”232 Cities could regulate private law matters as defined
and limited by the state.233 But powers that touched on liberty or property
were considered unusual and narrowly read.234 Dillon’s Rule was later
embraced by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,235 in which
the Court held that municipal corporations (e.g., cities) are “political
subdivisions of the state” that could be destroyed without or against “the
consent of the citizens.”236 This changed in the nineteenth century, as cities
were empowered through Progressive Era reforms that emerged from various
post–Civil War factors: cities grew more populous and urbanized, and
movements emerged to challenge local governments’ legal powerlessness.237
As a result, some states embraced home rule, which gave cities “a broader
and more permanent source of authority from which to govern.”238 Local
governments could only legislate in matters of local concern; they were not
given “plenary legislative authority.”239 This was known as “imperio” home
rule: cities had full control over local matters but could not legislate in areas
of state concern.240 Courts struggled to interpret what qualifies as a “local
matter,” and many were unwilling to uphold local governments’ immunity
from state interference, allowing states to dominate if there was an interest in
a shared matter.241
In 1953, the American Municipal Association proposed providing local
governments with full “state legislative authority” while allowing states to
“structure or preempt” general local laws.242 This led to most states
amending or enacting new home rule provisions in their constitutions.243
Over time, states have continued to modify local governments’ authority,

note 1 (noting that states can create a state cause of action and ban “qualified immunity as a
defense”).
229. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 7 (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-Rule-PrinciplesReportWEB-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M54J-3QCM].
230. Id. at 9.
231. Diller, supra note 16, at 1112–13.
232. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 229, at 10.
233. Diller, supra note 16, at 1113.
234. Id.
235. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
236. Id. at 178–79; see also Diller, supra note 16, at 1113.
237. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 229, at 11.
238. Diller, supra note 16, at 1113.
239. Id.
240. Id.; see also NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 229, at 11. This version of home
rule treated states and cities as distinct. Diller, supra note 16, at 1113.
241. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 229, at 11–12.
242. Id. at 12.
243. Id.
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leading to a “varied landscape”244 that keeps courts central in interpreting
constitutional and statutory home rule provisions.245 Thus, generally, state
political subdivisions, such as cities, can exercise lawmaking authority to the
extent that states have delegated such authority to them246 as allowed under
the state constitution.247
There are two strands of home rule: (1) initiative or the power of a local
government to act as to local issues and (2) immunity or the ability of a local
government to protect their decisions from state preemption.248 Through
home rule powers, cities have discretion to create solutions to solve local
problems by legislating and adopting social policies without approval from
the state legislature.249 But despite local governments’ powers to take
initiative, those powers are often constrained by the doctrine of preemption,
which requires that local laws be consistent with state or general law.250
Where there is conflict, state law prevails.251
In New York, home rule lives within the state constitution.252 Although
NYS has a long tradition of active local government, local powers were given
by the state and could be “taken back by the state.”253 Early NYS
constitutions provided little authority to local governments, but gradually,
each revision expanded their powers, resulting in article IX being ratified in
1963254 to “strengthen[] the governments closest to the people,” as stated by
former Governor Nelson Rockefeller.255 Article IX and Municipal Home
Rule Law section 10 give the city broad authority to handle its matters.256
Article IX outlines the powers of local governments and the interplay
between local and state relations.257 Under article IX, local governments are
given two broad powers: First, local governments can “adopt and amend
local laws” as to their “property, affairs, or government.”258 Second, local
governments can adopt and amend laws on ten enumerated subjects, which
includes the protection, safety, and well-being of persons within the locality,
244. Id. at 13.
245. Id.
246. See Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guiderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y.
1989); see also Wells v. Town of Salina, 23 N.E. 870, 871 (N.Y. 1890); Whittaker v. Village
of Franklinville, 191 N.E. 716, 717 (N.Y. 1934); Inc. Vill. of Atl. Beach v. Kimmel, 223
N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1966).
247. See Inc. Vill. of Atl. Beach, 223 N.E.2d at 490.
248. Richard Briffault, Article IX: The Promise and Limits of Home Rule 4 (Columbia L.
Sch. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 14-436, 2015).
249. Id. at 7; Diller, supra note 16, at 1110.
250. Briffault, supra note 248, at 7.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2–3.
253. Id. at 2.
254. Id. at 3.
255. Michael A. Cardozo & Zachary W. Klinger, Home Rule in New York: The Need for
a Change, 38 PACE L. REV. 90, 91 (2017) (quoting ROBERT B. WARD, NEW YORK STATE
GOVERNMENT 547 (2d ed. 2006)).
256. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2; see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney
2022).
257. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
258. Id. § 2(c).
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regardless of whether the law relates to its “property, affairs or
government.”259 The state constitution supports local governments’ broad
powers by mandating that the powers and privileges bestowed by article IX
“be liberally construed.”260 Furthermore, in New York, the judiciary permits
cities to create private causes of action.261 This power is supported by an
intermediate appellate court’s holding262 that the breadth of home rule
powers “is broad enough to include the creation of a private cause of
action.”263
However, local governments do not have unlimited or absolute power to
enact laws in NYS. Preemption will be further discussed in the next section,
but generally, home rule powers are limited. If a local government in NYS
exercises their power in a manner that is inconsistent with the state
constitution or general law, NYS law preempts such local law.264
Furthermore, under Adler v. Deegan,265 there are matters on which the state
can legislate even if it falls within home rule powers. In Adler, the state
enacted a multiple dwelling law that was challenged as an unconstitutional
violation of home rule provisions because it touched on the “property, affairs,

259. Id. The ten enumerated subjects are:
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal,
terms of office, compensation, hours of work, protection, welfare and safety of its
officers and employees, except that cities and towns shall not have such power with
respect to members of the legislative body of the county in their capacities as county
officers.
(2) In the case of a city, town or village, the membership and composition of its
legislative body.
(3) The transaction of its business.
(4) The incurring of its obligations, except that local laws relating to financing by
the issuance of evidence of indebtedness by such local government shall be
consistent with laws enacted by the legislature.
(5) The presentation, ascertainment and discharge of claims against it.
(6) The acquisition, care, management and use of its highways, roads, streets,
avenues and property.
(7) The acquisition of its transit facilities and the ownership and operation thereof.
(8) The levy, collection and administration of local taxes authorized by the
legislature and of assessments for local improvements, consistent with laws enacted
by the legislature.
(9) The wages or salaries, the hours of work or labor, and the protection, welfare
and safety of persons employed by any contractor or sub-contractor performing
work, labor or service for it.
(10) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of
persons or property therein.
Id. § 2(c)(ii)(1)–(10).
260. Id. § 3(c).
261. See Diller, supra note 16, at 1133 n.117. In many home rule states, whether local
governments can create a private right of action remains uncertain. Id. at 1134. Despite this
uncertainty or sometimes outright denial, many cities have used state delegation of power or
home rule powers alone to establish “private rights of action by local ordinance.” Id. at
1132–34.
262. See id. at 1172.
263. Bracker v. Cohen, 612 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (App. Div. 1994).
264. N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c); Briffault, supra note 248, at 7.
265. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929), amended by 252 N.Y. 615 (1930).
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or government” of the city.266 The court found the law constitutional because
it addressed unsanitary living conditions, and the state’s police power “has
never been questioned when it dealt directly with hygienic conditions of a
community.”267 As NYC is a starting point for a vast amount of immigrants,
any disease that could affect the city would touch the welfare of the state as
immigrants move throughout the state and beyond.268 In his concurrence,
then Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo considered that there are matters where
state and local concerns overlap; when the state has a “substantial degree” of
concern in such matters, then the state may legislate.269
The next section discusses the preemption doctrine.
2. The State Preemption Doctrine
The powers given to local governments by the NYS constitution is
fundamentally limited by the preemption doctrine—local laws must not
conflict with the constitution or general laws of the state.270 It matters not
that local governments have been bestowed with considerable powers, or that
states are restricted in meddling with local concerns.271 The preemption
doctrine expresses “the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act . . .
with respect to matters of State concern.”272 Neither the constitution nor a
statute can prevent a state from interfering in matters in which the state has a
strong interest.273
There are three ways a city ordinance may be preempted: (1) the ordinance
expressly conflicts with the state law, (2) the state has either explicitly or
implicitly expressed an intent to occupy the relevant field, or (3) the city
ordinance is conflict preempted.274
Express conflict occurs when the state expressly forbids the local
government from enacting an ordinance as to a specific issue.275
Local governments are preempted from imposing additional regulations
on a subject that the state substantially regulates (effectively occupying the

266. Id. at 706 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)).
267. Id. at 709.
268. See id. at 708–09.
269. See id. at 713–14 (Cardozo, J., concurring). The Adler case continues to be a “guiding
principle of Home Rule today.” Cardozo & Klinger, supra note 255, at 94.
270. Briffault, supra note 248, at 7.
271. Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y.
1989).
272. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (citing
Floyd v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 300 N.E.2d 704, 705–06 (N.Y. 1973)).
273. See id. at 586–87; see also Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d
266, 273 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
274. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 190 (N.Y. 2001); Mayor
of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 273; Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors
in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of New York,
No. 655987/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/NY-FWW-Amicus-FINAL-3.15.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y7E-VRZQ].
275. See Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 11.
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field).276 This is known as field preemption. For example, in Albany Area
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland,277 a town board adopted a local law
imposing an “impact fee” when building permit applicants attempt to change
the land use in a way that results in more traffic.278 The court held that the
local law was preempted because the state legislature had enacted a
“comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in the field of highway
funding.”279 State laws regulated the budget and financing of road
improvements, creating a detailed system for highway repair budgets,
limiting “amounts to be raised” for highway improvements, regulating fund
expenses, and so forth.280 The specificity of such laws indicates the
legislature’s intent to create a uniform scheme among different localities
within the state.281 The town board’s local law interfered with this scheme
because it allowed towns to go against statutory restrictions.282 Thus, when
the same subject matter is regulated by the city and state, it “is deemed
inconsistent with the State’s transcendent interest,” regardless of whether
there is an actual conflict between the two laws.283 This is true even when
the differences are minor.284 The subject matter and purpose of the state law,
as well as need for uniformity across the state, are also relevant inquiries for
field preemption.285 Without explicit authority, any local ordinance that
interferes with a field that the state occupies is rendered invalid.286
However, a law is not preempted because it touches on some matters of
state law; the state must show that they wish to occupy the field “to the
exclusion of local law.”287 Furthermore, when local governments enact laws
of general application that address “legitimate concerns,” such laws are not

276. See id. at 15–16.
277. 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989).
278. Id. at 921. The town roots its support for the law in several provisions of the Municipal
Home Rule Law. Id. at 921–22. In its opinion, the court decided not to determine what
delegated power justified the law. See id. at 922. The sole issue they considered was whether
such law was preempted. See id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 922–23.
281. See id. at 923.
282. See id.
283. Id. at 922.
284. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (Sup. Ct.
2004).
285. See Albany Area Builders Ass’n, 546 N.E.2d at 923; see also Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals
of Saddle Rock, 795 N.E.2d 619, 624 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a state legislation that imposes
a “statewide standard for area variance review” preempts local authority because of the
advantages of a uniform standard of review and “traditional respect for the primacy of state
interest”); Dougal v. County of Suffolk, 477 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 1984) (holding
that local ordinances that regulate drug paraphernalia are preempted because of New York’s
desire to adopt a “State-wide approach to combat the drug paraphernalia industry”).
286. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Police Benevolent
Ass’n of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, No. 653624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2021), 2021 WL
3137571.
287. People v. Judiz, 344 N.E.2d 399, 401 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Webb, 356 N.Y.S.2d
494, 498 (Crim. Ct. 1974).
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preempted if it “incidentally infringes on a preempted field.”288 For example,
in Vatore v. Commissioner of Consumer Affairs,289 the New York Court of
Appeals considered whether the Adolescent Tobacco Use Prevention Act,290
enacted by the legislature, preempted Local Law 67 of 1990, which regulates
the sale of tobacco products in vending machines.291 The act was less
restrictive than Local Law 67 as to location requirements for the vending
machines.292 Although the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division, held that Local Law 67 was preempted because it added
further regulation in a field that the state legislature wished to occupy,293 the
Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the law was valid.294 The court
stated that (1) the act did not show a need to uniformly control the sale of
tobacco products in vending machines across the state, and (2) the statutory
scheme was not “so broad and detailed in scope” that it prevented local
regulation of the field, especially when the local law “further[s] the State’s
policy interests” of discouraging adolescents from using tobacco products.295
Also relevant in the court’s decision was a preemption provision in the act as
to the “distribution of tobacco products without charge.”296 This provision
led the court to infer that, by expressly preempting one provision of the act,
the legislature did not intend to preempt other sections.297
In contrast to field preemption, conflict preemption occurs when a local
law is inconsistent with state law because the local law either forbids conduct
that state law permits or restricts rights under state law.298 For example, in
Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v. New York City Department of Consumer
Affairs,299 NYC enacted a cabaret law that forced patrons to leave cabarets
at 4:00 a.m., in contrast to the state’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law
section 106(5)(b),300 which prohibited the sale of alcohol past 4:00 a.m. but
allowed patrons to stay on the premises until 4:30 a.m.301 The court referred
288. DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y. 2001).
289. 634 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 1994).
290. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-AA to 1399-MM-3 (McKinney 2022).
291. Vatore, 634 N.E.2d at 958.
292. Id. at 959.
293. See Vatore v. Comm’r of Consumer Affs. of N.Y., 596 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114–15 (App.
Div. 1993), rev’d, 634 N.E. 958 (N.Y. 1994).
294. Vatore v. Comm’r of Consumer Affs. of N.Y., 634 N.E.2d 958, 959 (N.Y. 1994).
295. Id. at 959–60.
296. Id. at 960.
297. See id.
298. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 491 (N.Y.
1983); see also F.T.B Realty Corp. v. Goodman, 89 N.E.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. 1949); Wholesale
Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (App. Div. 1962),
aff’d, 189 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 1963); Chwick v. Mulvey, 915 N.Y.S.2d 578, 584 (App. Div.
2010); Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 12–13.
299. 543 N.E.2d 725 (N.Y. 1989). For another example of conflict preemption, see
Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc., 234 N.Y.S.2d at 864–65 (holding that a local law
regulating employees’ wages is conflict preempted because state law provides for a different
minimum wage framework).
300. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 106(5)(b) (McKinney 1989).
301. Lansdown Ent. Corp., 543 N.E.2d at 726.
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to its decision in People v. De Jesus,302 in which the court held that a
Rochester, New York, ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol after
2:00 a.m. was preempted because it directly made illegal what the state
specifically permitted.303 In Lansdown Entertainment Corp., the court held
the same: the cabaret law is preempted because it is in direct opposition to
what the state allows.304 The court spent some time reviewing the general
application exception to the preemption rule.305 The respondent invoked the
exception, stating that the cabaret law is of general application because the
locality acted within their police power “to maintain the peace, comfort and
decency of residential neighborhoods by controlling noise and traffic.”306
Still, the ordinance’s infringement must be incidental.307 Here, there was “a
head-on collision” with section 106(5)(b) because the cabaret law did not
allow patrons to stay until the permissible time under state law and thus
directly impacted the state’s power to regulate the matter.308
Although there are cases that hold that direct conflict of laws result in state
preemption, other courts disagree. When a local law merely adds or
“supplements” in an area where a state statute is silent, some courts have held
that such laws are not conflict preempted.309 For example, in People v.
Judiz,310 the city enacted a local law that forbade the possession of “imitation
pistols or revolvers” that could “readily be mistaken for real guns.”311 The
defendant, convicted for having a toy gun that resembled a real gun, argued
that state penal law preempted the local law because (1) an intent to
unlawfully use the toy gun is necessary, and (2) mere possession does not
automatically infer intent.312 Ultimately, the court upheld the defendant’s
conviction, finding the city law to be a valid exercise of state constitutional
and municipal home rule powers.313 The applicable portion of state penal
law was not restricted to imitation guns but also encompassed other types of
302. 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981).
303. See id. at 1261, 1263.
304. 543 N.E.2d at 727.
305. Id. at 726. For the law of general application exception to apply, the local law must
be of “legitimate concern[]” to the locality and only “incidentally infringe” on the state law.
Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. Zorn v. Howe, 716 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (App. Div. 2000) (stating that “courts have
upheld local laws that provide details of a topic on which State statutes remained silent,
wherein the local ordinance supplements, rather than supplants, the State legislation”); see
also People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1974); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of
New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
310. 344 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1976). For another example, see Garcia v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 106 N.E.3d 1187, 1191–92, 1201 (N.Y. 2018) (stating that the
NYC health code adding flu vaccinations to the list of vaccinations required for children to
enroll in schools under New York Public Health Law section 2164 is not conflict preempted;
the list in section 2164 is not “an exclusive one that may not be expanded by local
municipalities to which the authority to regulate vaccinations has been delegated”).
311. Judiz, 344 N.E.2d at 401.
312. See id.
313. Id.
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deadly weapons with intent to use unlawfully.314 Although the statute
imposes an element of intent, local governments are not “precluded” from
imposing “further control,” even if it results in a “direct prohibition.”315 Only
full occupation of the field prevents local governments from further action.316
Thus, the local law and state law are not inconsistent because the local law
targets a specific weapon (toy guns not easily discernible as toys), whereas
the state covers many other types of weapons “used with illegal intent.”317
Lastly, when a local law is enacted through a city’s home rule powers,
there is a presumption against preemption.318 Because home rule powers are
to be liberally construed under article IX, section 3(c) of the state
constitution, a liberal construction would require the presumption that local
laws are not preempted by state law unless the statutory text “manifestly and
unambiguously supersedes local law.”319 Local power cannot be liberally
construed if limits imposed by state preemption are not “narrowly”
interpreted.320
The next part argues that NYC acted within its home rule powers to enact
Local Law 48, and that the law is not preempted.
III. AN AFFIRMATIVE GRANT OF HOME RULE POWER
Part II examined the breadth and limits of home rule power and state
preemption. First, the state constitution provides the scope of a local
government’s home rule power.321 NYC has broad home rule powers to
create and amend laws as to the locality’s affairs and ten enumerated
subjects.322 Second, even though home rule powers may be broad, such
powers are constrained by three types of preemption.323 This Note argues
that Local Law 48 is likely a valid exercise of the city’s home rule power and
is likely not preempted. Part III.A outlines supporting arguments for why the
ordinance is lawful under the home rule power. Part III.B argues that the
ordinance will not be preempted because there is no express, field, or conflict
preemption.

314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 402.
318. Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 5–7; see also Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 10–11, Police Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v.
City of New York, No. 653624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 2020), 2020 WL 10502751.
319. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an
Anti-preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New York 646 (NYU L. Sch. Pub. L.
Working Paper, Paper No. 14-28, 2014). For cases that consider limits to state preemption,
see People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1974); Judiz, 344 N.E.2d at 401–02;
McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 965 N.Y.S.2d 811, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d as
modified, 985 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 2014).
320. Hills, supra note 319, at 652.
321. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 258–63 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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A. NYC Can Create a Cause of Action
Local Law 48 is likely a valid exercise of NYC’s home rule powers.
Opponents of the law may criticize Local Law 48 by using the reasoning in
Adler324: regulating the police force touches on the welfare of the state
because removing indemnification and qualified immunity as a defense
would expose officers to liability, thereby burdening them, reducing their
efficiency, and allowing crime to spread.325 The state has an interest in
officers having immunity so that they can efficiently perform their duties.326
Alternatively, even if Local Law 48 falls within one of the ten enumerated
subjects, it is prohibited by article IX, section 2(c) because that area of law
has been restricted by the state’s regulation of immunities and defenses of
officers.327 Thus, the regulation of immunities and defenses of police
officers is not solely within the affairs of a local government but involves a
field in which the state has already legislated.
Still, home rule, in its simplest form, is understood as conferring on local
governments a permanent source of power to decide on matters of local
concern and impact without the need for explicit state permission.328 While
the state may have an interest in regulating police officers generally, NYC
faces unique problems as the home to one of the largest police forces in the
country.329 The New York Civil Liberties Union’s NYPD Misconduct
Complaint Database contains 97,950 entries regarding complaints for use of
force alone.330 Generally, since 2000, complaints that allow race to be
self-reported revealed that “about 81% [of impacted persons] are Black or
Latinx.”331 Thus, who can more effectively and efficiently respond to the
problems that unrestrained police brutality has caused but the local
government, which is not only the “closest to those governed” but also “better
situated” to both identify the needs of the governed and respond with
policies?332 Furthermore, the vast diversity and varying needs in the state
emphasize the importance of local democracy.333 NYC needs to have a
degree of freedom to respond to problems on the ground that other areas of
324. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 210–11, 222 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part I.B.
328. See supra notes 256–63 and accompanying text.
329. See About NYPD, CITY OF N.Y., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/aboutnypd/about-nypd-landing.page [https://perma.cc/V2X9-NCW7] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
330. NYPD
Misconduct
Complaint
Database,
N.Y.
C.L.
UNION,
https://www.nyclu.org/en/campaigns/nypd-misconduct-database
[https://perma.cc/H5S8PHJJ] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
331. Id. This percentage refers to all types of complaints. It is not limited to complaints
for use of force.
332. See Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 7; see also Hills, supra note 319, at 646
(“A single statewide policy might bog down in acrimonious gridlock, but municipal legislators
can more easily enact local solutions because their constituents share more consensus on the
same issues than the citizens of the state as a whole.”).
333. See Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 7.

910

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

the state may not face. Removing immunities and defenses from police
officers for specific violations like use of excessive force and unreasonable
searches and seizures motivates officers to be conscious of their actions and
affords individuals, especially those from underrepresented communities,
greater protection.334
Additionally, the ten enumerated subjects give local governments power
over “most matters” of local concern.335 Regulating the accountability of
police officers would likely fall within the city’s power to legislate for the
safety and well-being of NYC residents and thus, within the city’s affairs.
When a local law is passed pursuant to its state-delegated home rule power,
it is to be “judged by the same standards as an act of the Legislature itself.”336
There is “little litigation” as to whether a local government is able to “act
concerning local matters.”337
Given the breadth of powers conferred to municipalities under the state
constitution and Municipal Home Rule Law,338 as well as an explicit
authority to liberally construe such powers,339 local governments have
considerable “latitude” to enact local laws, even if the law’s subject is within
a field that the state “has already legislated in.”340 Absent clear intent by the
state to preempt, state laws should not preempt local laws.341 Allowing
localities such latitude paves the way for social and economic innovations
that cast cities as “leading innovators” with the potential “to identify and fix
policy mistakes locally.”342 Local Law 48 is one such innovation; having
identified that injured persons are unprotected in the wake of police killings,
the city has sought to grapple with how best to deal with police immunities
and indemnification to hold officers accountable for their actions.343
B. Local Law 48 Is Not Preempted
Local Law 48 is likely not preempted.344 As stated previously, preemption
occurs when there is (1) an express conflict, (2) the state shows an intent to
334. See The Fight to End Qualified Immunity Is Just Beginning in States Across the
Country, GOVERNING (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.governing.com/sponsored/the-fight-to-endqualified-immunity-is-just-beginning-in-states-across-the-country [https://perma.cc/3EFAF2AM]; SBA (@SBANYPD_Archive), TWITTER (Apr. 16, 2021, 5:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/SBANYPD_Archive/status/1383168759997870085
[https://perma.cc/
XMS4-K3TM].
335. Briffault, supra note 248, at 7.
336. People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 47 (1945).
337. Briffault, supra note 248, at 7.
338. See supra Part II.B.1.
339. See supra notes 260, 318–20 and accompanying text.
340. McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 965 N.Y.S.2d 811, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d
as modified, 985 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 2014).
341. See id.; Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 7.
342. See Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 8.
343. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.1.
344. Note that there remains a question of whether Local Law 48 is unconstitutionally
vague. See Police Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 168 N.Y.S.3d 462
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occupy the field, or (3) there is conflict between the ordinance and state
law.345 First, there is no express preemption for Local Law 48 because the
state has not explicitly prohibited the city from enacting laws that regulate
the immunities and defenses of officers in civil actions for unreasonable
searches and seizures and use of excessive force.346
Second, Local Law 48 is not field preempted because the legislature has
not established a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme as to
immunities and defenses of police officers.347 To begin the analysis, it is
important to consider the alternative situation in which General Municipal
Law section 50-k and Public Officers Law section 17(9) reflect the intent of
the legislature to occupy the field of immunities and indemnification in civil
actions against public employees. Both laws could be considered as enacting
a detailed and comprehensive scheme to protect state and NYC employees in
civil actions through indemnification, defenses, and immunities.348 The
statutes explain who falls under “employee,”349 set a standard for when
indemnification can be applied,350 and explicitly proclaim that all state,
federal, local, and common-law immunities, defenses, and indemnification
are available to employees.351 Public Officers Law section 17(9) goes as far
as to deliberately state that such immunities, defenses, and indemnification
include those provided to officers or employees of the state or “any other
level of government.”352 This presents a balancing act; the need to balance
plaintiff’s recovery in civil actions with the need to protect state and city
employees.
Even so, both laws reflect defenses in a general manner and not to the
levels of specificity observed in Albany Area Builders Ass’n.353 NYS courts
have had to impute qualified immunity in the absence of an express directive
as to whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for state
causes of action.354 General Municipal Law section 50-k and Public Officers
Law section 17 do not address defenses, immunities, and indemnification
specifically to police officers but to employees generally; “the mere fact” that
a local law may touch on matters dealt with by state law does not
automatically invalidate the law.355 The legislature, through section 50-k and
section 17, has not expressed a desire to preclude NYC from creating

(App. Div. 2022), for an example of a law under which both preemption and constitutionality
are considered. This Note does not discuss the constitutionality question.
345. See supra Part II.B.2.
346. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text.
348. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2022). Public Officers Law section 17
is relevant for the state scheme of indemnification and defenses, which mirrors, to an extent,
the general municipal law.
349. See GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(e); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(1) (McKinney 2022).
350. See supra notes 96–98, 101 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 99, 102 and accompanying text.
352. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(9).
353. See supra notes 277–82 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
355. See People v. Judiz, 344 N.E.2d 399, 401 (N.Y. 1976).
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additional legislation that would remove certain immunities in very specific
circumstances. Indeed, the state regulation “does not include an overarching
statement of intent to cover the waterfront.”356 Like the court found in
International Franchise Ass’n v. City of New York357 regarding NYC’s fair
workweek law purporting to regulate workers’ schedules despite NYS
law,358 a court analyzing Local Law 48 may find that current state law is
“a little this” (general immunities and defenses that are not limited by the
statute), and “a little that” (civil actions).359 Local Law 48 is narrowly
limited to regulate two specific violations (unreasonable searches and
seizures and excessive use of force), committed by very specific employees
(police officers), and thus, it does not infringe on “State prerogatives.”360
Furthermore, opponents of Local Law 48 could argue that the ordinance
may encourage other cities to enact similar legislation, disrupting “the State’s
efforts to achieve a uniform, statewide policy.”361 This would likely be
unpersuasive. Although General Municipal Law section 50-k and Public
Officers Law section 17 mirroring each other may indicate the legislature’s
attempt to maintain consistency, not all localities within the state are the
same. Here, there is no express need for statewide uniformity, especially
considering that NYC has one of the largest municipal police departments362
and is the most populous city in the country.363 By referring to employees
and civil actions generally, there is no indication that the legislature intended
to preempt the city from passing further legislation. As Local Law 48 serves
to protect the safety and well-being of persons within the city from
unreasonable searches and seizures and use of excessive force by police
officers, a court may apply a presumption against preemption.364
Third, Local Law 48 is not conflict preempted. Opponents of the law may
argue that Local Law 48 directly conflicts with section 50-k and section 17,
either because Local Law 48 (1) impliedly forbids indemnification of police
officers who are city employees and explicitly forbids the defense of
356. Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of New York, No. 655987/2018, 2020 WL 871402, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 2020), aff’d, 148 N.Y.S.3d 28 (App. Div. 2021), appeal dismissed,
174 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y.).
357. No. 655987/2018, 2020 WL 871402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 2020), aff’d, 148
N.Y.S.3d 28 (App. Div. 2021), appeal dismissed, 174 N.E.3d 368 (N.Y.).
358. See id. at *1.
359. See id. at *2.
360. See id.
361. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 286,
at 25. This case is about a different NYC law that made the use of chokeholds a misdemeanor.
Id. at 3. It is not related to Local Law 48, but the arguments asserted there could be used
against Local Law 48.
362. See supra notes 329–34 and accompanying text; see also Int. 2220-2021, supra note
207 (testimony of Alexandra Fisher, senior trial attorney at Brooklyn Defender Services)
(stating that the New York City Police Department “is the size of the seventh-largest standing
army in the world with a total budget of around $11 billion”).
363. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/QAK3-SZRZ] (last visited Nov. 7,
2022).
364. See supra notes 318–20 and accompanying text.
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qualified immunity available under state law, or (2) restricts defenses
available under the state law.365 Furthermore, it could be argued that Local
Law 48’s lack of an intentional or reckless conduct provision366 goes against
section 50-k, under which indemnification is required unless the employee
acted intentionally or recklessly.367 The absence of intentionality goes
against the balance between allowing plaintiffs to recover for constitutional
violations and protecting city and state employees, as seen through state and
federal case law that led to the development of qualified immunity.368 Thus,
like with the city’s cabaret law discussed in Lansdown Entertainment Corp.,
there is a “head-on collision” between fundamental components of Local
Law 48 and section 50-k, namely, protections afforded to employees when
there are civil actions that result in judgments against them.369
However, state laws that set out a regulatory scheme that applies to an
entire state set the floor but not the ceiling.370 Local governments are free to
supplement state law.371 In at least two cases, the New York Court of
Appeals has expressed that the argument that a law is invalid if it forbids
what the state allows is too broad and meritless.372 Here, Local Law 48 is
like the city law restricting toy guns in People v. Judiz.373 While section 50-k
addresses civil actions and defenses generally, Local Law 48 addresses a
particular type of civil action (use of excessive force and unreasonable
searches and seizures) and the qualified immunity defense for a particular
employee (police officers).374 Although there is overlap because section
50-k and section 17 can apply to civil actions for unreasonable searches and
seizures and excessive force, it is settled that a local law is not invalid merely
because the local law deals with some of the same subject matters that the
state law addresses.375 If conflict preemption is applied too broadly, then the
power of local governments to regulate would be “illusory.”376

365. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
366. See generally supra Part II.A.1.
367. See supra Part I.B.
368. See generally supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.
369. See supra notes 307–08 and accompanying text.
370. Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors in Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 274, at 13. Although section 50-k only applies to NYC, the
equivalent state version under Public Officers Law section 17 is a regulatory scheme for the
entire state. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2022); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17
(McKinney 2022).
371. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
372. See People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1972) (“[When s]tate law is silent on
a subject, the likelihood is that a local law regulating that subject will prohibit something
permitted elsewhere in the state. That is the essence of home rule”); see also Jancyn Mfg.
Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907–08 (N.Y. 1987).
373. See supra notes 310–17 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.1. Compare Local Law 48 with Judiz, where the state law in
question contained a general list of weapons covered, while the local law focused only on toy
guns that resembled real guns. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 309–17 and accompanying text.
376. See Garcia v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 106 N.E.3d 1187, 1200
(N.Y. 2018); see also Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 457.
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Even if a court were to find that there is inconsistency with the state law,
a local law may still be upheld if there is a “special local problem” that
supports the need for the “variance.”377 Although police brutality is
widespread in the state, NYC is the focus of police reform because, as stated
previously, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) is one of the
largest police departments in the United States, serving one of the most
populous and diverse cities in the country.378 Local Law 48 could serve the
purpose of creating transparency and accountability, as well as fostering trust
between the NYPD and neighborhoods, “particularly in communities of
color.”379
IV. LOCAL LAW 48 CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN PRACTICE
Even though NYC may have authority to create Local Law 48, and the
ordinance may not be preempted, is Local Law 48 effective in practice?
While Local Law 48 is limited, it is a good step forward.
Local Law 48 creates a limited right in two aspects. First, it offers
protection only against unwarranted searches and seizures and/or use of
excessive force (both are not necessary to have a cause of action).380 No
other right is protected under the law. This contrasts with legislation enacted
in Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which cover all
violations of each state’s bill of rights.381 Colorado’s law gained “national
spotlight” because it specifically prohibited qualified immunity,382 as well as
certain statutory immunities.383 Connecticut’s HB 6004 has also been
praised as “focused on bringing real change” because it went from providing
a state constitutional tort remedy only for “wrongful arrests and unreasonable
searches and seizures” to providing remedies for the rest of the rights
enumerated in Connecticut’s bill of rights.384 There are a vast array of
constitutional violations that remain outside of the sphere of Local Law 48,
and thus police officers will still be able to invoke qualified immunity
defenses.385 In this sense, Local Law 48 is lackluster and should follow the
lead of the other four states by addressing all constitutional violations.

377. Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 458.
378. See supra notes 362–63; see also Rebecca C. Lewis, Police Brutality Is Prevalent
Statewide in NY, CITY & STATE N.Y. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.cityandstateny.com/
policy/2020/09/police-brutality-is-prevalent-statewide-in-ny/175664/
[https://perma.cc/R7QS-LT35].
379. Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207, at 1 (testimony of Andrew Yang). Note that Andrew
Yang was not discussing Local Law 48 but was generally praising efforts for “further
transparency and accountability.” Id. However, his statements are generally applicable to
what Local Law 48 could do for the people of NYC.
380. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-802 (2022).
381. See supra Part I.C.
382. See Kyle Johnson, A New Frontier for Ending Qualified Immunity: State Civil Rights
Acts, 26 PUB. INT. L. REP. 55, 59–60 (2020).
383. See supra notes 128–29.
384. Sibilla, supra note 135; see also supra Part I.C.2.
385. See Int. 2220-2021, supra note 207, at 12–13 (testimony of the Legal Aid Society).
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Second, Local Law 48 is much narrower in coverage as it only places
liability on “covered individuals,” which is defined to only include officers
who work for the police department and special patrolmen.386 New Mexico’s
HB 4 is historic as it is the first and only state to “enact legislative qualified
immunity reform for all public officials.”387 While Local Law 48 does not
necessarily need to be as broad as HB 4, it still holds a much narrower
definition of “police officer” than Colorado’s, Connecticut’s, and
Massachusetts’s laws, which encompass more people under definitions of
peace officer, law enforcement officer, and police officer.388 By limiting
Local Law 48 only to the NYPD, many abuses by jail guards, corrections
officers, and school guards remain without a remedy because they are
excluded from the city ordinance.389
However, Local Law 48 is revolutionary in its blanket ban of qualified
immunity and relevant immunities, as well as in its silence on
indemnification.390 This is in contrast to Colorado, where despite the breadth
of protections guaranteed under SB 20-217, at least one person has noted that
the law “unfortunately” allows both “tort immunity and indemnification to
government officers acting within the scope of their employment.”391
Though qualified immunity is banned as a defense, there will still be
“barriers” that prevent plaintiffs from holding officers personally
accountable for misconduct.392 Similarly, Connecticut’s HB 6004 has been
criticized because of its “multiple loopholes,” which grant immunity when
an officer has a “good faith belief” (without defining the term), and because
it provides for officers’ indemnification.393 New Mexico’s HB 4 offers even
greater immunity from personal liability: indemnification is required when
a person acts within the proper scope of authority, with no mention of
whether there needs to be good faith or reasonable belief.394 Such loopholes
will continue to result in many victims being unable to seek justice, and most
officers not being held personally liable for violating a person’s
constitutional rights.395 As NYS law provides for the indemnification of
state and city employees unless they acted intentionally or recklessly (though
employers still indemnify even if there is intentional or reckless conduct),396
Local Law 48 roots out the problem of officers not facing any consequences
for their actions by placing liability on both officers and their employers

386. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
387. See Jay Schweikert, New Mexico’s Landmark Qualified Immunity Reform Gets It
Mostly Right, CATO INST. (Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.cato.org/commentary/new-mexicoslandmark-qualified-immunity-reform-gets-it-mostly-right [https://perma.cc/A3YU-HXEV].
388. See supra Part I.C.
389. See Sibilla, supra note 1.
390. See supra Part II.A.1.
391. Johnson, supra note 382, at 63–64.
392. Id. at 64.
393. Sibilla, supra note 135; see also supra Part I.C.2.
394. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
395. Sibilla, supra note 127.
396. See supra Part I.B.
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separately.397 Although it is not clear whether employees will be
indemnified, previous drafts discussing indemnification and its absence from
the enacted law support the assumption that officers will not be
indemnified.398
Thus, NYC’s Local Law 48 does what it purports to do—provide plaintiffs
with a right of security that is not shackled with immunities and
indemnification for an officer who unconstitutionally violates a plaintiff’s
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and/or the use of
excessive force.399 While this right is limited and should be expanded to
include other constitutional rights and covered individuals, it is a good first
step to test the waters and begin to hold officers accountable. Still, there is a
question of whether the right is too broad. Qualified immunity developed
because of the concern that officers will be prevented from efficiently doing
their jobs due to the fear of constant liability.400 It may be sufficient to
impose a detailed and objective good-faith defense while removing all
indemnification, thereby balancing the need to protect plaintiffs who suffer
constitutional violations and holding police officers accountable while
protecting them from a vast amount of litigation. It remains unclear whether
removal of immunities and indemnification will deter officers, as the
qualified immunity doctrine began to take shape not long after Monroe
allowed suits against police officers.401 However, changes are already
evident in Colorado, where several officers have been charged with failure
to intervene and report as required by SB 20-217.402 Furthermore, a memo
from lawyers representing officers of the Police Benevolent Association of
the City of New York cautioned officers on using force unless they are certain
that using such force is clearly legal.403 Thus, NYC is a good testing ground
for a law that could continue to develop to hold officers accountable to those
that they injure. While the Supreme Court continues to uphold the qualified
immunity doctrine and the federal government fails to reach a consensus,
Local Law 48 could potentially influence and encourage further
policymaking not only at the state level, but also in major cities across the
country.404

397. See supra Part II.A.1.
398. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
399. See supra Part II.A.1.
400. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
401. See supra Parts I.A.2–3.
402. See Allison Sherry, It’s Early, but Colorado’s Police Reform Efforts Have Already
Resulted in Charges for Officers, CPR NEWS (Aug. 3, 2021, 4:33 PM),
https://www.cpr.org/2021/08/03/its-early-but-colorados-police-reform-efforts-have-alreadyresulted-in-charges-for-officers/ [https://perma.cc/6NPL-LSKY].
403. See SBA (@SBANYPD_Archive), TWITTER (Apr. 16, 2021, 5:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/SBANYPD_Archive/status/1383168759997870085
[https://perma.cc/XMS4-K3TM].
404. See supra notes 340–42 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity has made it difficult for plaintiffs to recover for
constitutional violations. Following recent cases of police brutality, four
states have taken the initiative to enact laws that either remove or limit
qualified immunity as a defense, allowing plaintiffs to recover when police
officers violate their state constitutional rights. Although NYS has not yet
successfully enacted a similar law, NYC, as one of the most populous cities
with the largest police force, enacted Local Law 48 to protect plaintiffs from
unreasonable searches and seizures and use of excessive force by police
officers.
Given the novelty of a city enacting a law to curtail qualified immunity
and other available defenses in the state, this Note analyzed Local Law 48
and argued that it is a valid exercise of the city’s home rule power and will
likely not be preempted by state law. Although Local Law 48 applies only
to the NYPD and protects limited constitutional rights, the law could be
effective in accomplishing its goal of holding police officers accountable by
stripping them of immunities and indemnification. While Local Law 48
leaves many violations uncovered and violators free to invoke immunity
defenses and be indemnified, it is a first and needed step for a city to protect
its people.

